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THE CLASSICAL AVOIDANCE CANON AS A PRINCIPLE OF 
GOOD-FAITH CONSTRUCTION 
Brian Taylor Goldman†  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 During her confirmation hearings, Justice Elena Kagan offered a surprising 
take on constitutional interpretation: “[W]e are all originalists.”1  Yet, originalism—
and its application—is not the same to all involved.  Specifically, some originalists 
have splintered on the most fundamental of interpretive questions: how judges should 
resolve the constitutional text when the meaning runs out. 
 This splintering centers on the distinction between (i) discovering the se-
mantic meaning of a text and (ii) applying such semantic meaning to a case at the 
fore.2  These categories have since been described as semantic interpretation, which 
is discerning the meaning of a particular text, and applicative interpretation, or con-
struction, which is the process that takes place when the semantic meaning of a text 
suffers from vagueness or irreducible ambiguity.3  As Jamal Greene noted, “many 
academic originalists have found it necessary to distinguish between constitutional 
interpretation, the hermeneutic work to which originalism may usefully apply, and 
constitutional construction . . .”4 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2017, Columbia Law School. Thank you to Professor Kent Greenawalt for his insight, advice 
and helpful suggestions. 
1 THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, Kagan: We Are All Originalists (June 29, 2010), http://le-
galtimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/kagan-we-are-all-originalists.html.  
2 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) 
(“The first of these moments is interpretation--which I shall stipulate is the process (or activity) that recognizes 
or discovers the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the legal text. The second moment is construction--
which I shall stipulate is the process that gives a text legal effect (either by translating the linguistic meaning 
into legal doctrine or by applying or implementing the text).”). 
3 Randy Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65, 65 (2011) (“[L]egal scholars 
are increasingly distinguishing between the activities of ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’...there is a difference 
between (a) discovering the semantic meaning of the words in the text of the Constitution, and (b) putting that 
meaning into effect by applying it in particular cases and controversies... [a]lthough I begin by offering defini-
tions of interpretation and construction, the labels are not important. Both activities could be called “interpreta-
tion” —for example, something like ‘semantic interpretation’ and ‘applicative interpretation.’”). 
4 Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183, 1190 (2011). 
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 This Article argues that the constitutional avoidance canon— in its classical 
iteration5— has a major role to play in constitutional construction.6  This is an open 
question in the ongoing debate over what background principles a court should em-
brace when constructing a constitutional provision in relation to a statutory text.7  As 
Randy Barnett challenges, “[i]f you think the courts should defer to the legislature 
when a particular clause is vague, you need a normative argument for this principle 
of construction.”8  This Article holds to the view that deference to the legislature, as 
contemplated by the classical avoidance canon, is an appropriate tool of good-faith 
constitutional construction in limited circumstances.9  
 It may seem odd that a principle of constitutional construction should find 
effect in the interpretation of a statute, but the process of construction necessarily 
requires interpretation of a statute, or a set of facts in the real world—the process of 
construction begins when irreducibly ambiguous or vague constitutional provisions 
must be applied to actual enactments.10  This Article is specifically limited to the 
scenario where federal legislation is judged against the Constitution.11  
 Part I of this Article gives an overview of the distinction between interpre-
tation and construction.  Part II argues that the views of Alexander Hamilton, Brutus, 
 
5 I use the classical iteration of the avoidance canon throughout this Article to address the concern that John 
McGinnis lays out in his recent and influential piece on the topic. See generally John O. McGinnis, The Duty 
of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843 (2016). McGinnis makes a convincing case based on the historical 
record that judges have what he labels a “duty of clarity”—a duty to use various legal and interpretive tools at 
hand to determine the semantic meaning of a text. If judges cannot clarify the text after such efforts, the legis-
lature’s interpretation of the text should prevail—that is, the courts should defer to the legislature. The classical 
avoidance canon is more appropriate for this paper in light of McGinnis’ argument—the canon requires judges 
to actually make two determinations of legal meaning, before preferring the route that doesn’t transgress the 
Constitution.  
6 There are those, including the late Justice Scalia, who believed that the distinction between interpretation and 
construction was a mirage. “As it happens, non-textualists have latched onto the duality of construction. From 
the germ of an idea in the theoretical works of Franz Lieber, scholars have elaborated a supposed distinction 
between interpretation and construction...[t]hus is born, out of false linguistic association, a whole new field of 
legal inquiry.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW 15 (2012).  
7 Whether constitutional avoidance should be a principle in constitutional construction seems to be an open 
question. See Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 
523 (2013) (“I have not argued against a principle of deference on the basis of a constitutional construction—
but I have not endorsed such a principle either.”).  
8 Barnett, supra note 3, at 70. 
9 The two rationales underlying the classical avoidance canon are both intimately related to deferring to the 
legislature. These two rationales are first, that “the court must construe the statute in accordance with the legis-
lative intent; since it is always to be presumed the legislature designed the statute to take effect, and not to 
nullify” and second, to “minimize the instances of judicial review in which an unelected court invalidates the 
work product of the democratically accountable branches.” Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in 
the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (2006).  
10 Gillian Metzger and Trevor Morrison reiterate this point when, in a discussion of the constitutional avoidance 
canon, they state “[a]dmittedly, the presumption of constitutionality is, by its terms, a principle of constitutional 
adjudication, not statutory interpretation. But it would be a mistake to assume the presumption has no impact 
on how courts assign statutory meaning. If the presumption of constitutionality leads courts to uphold enact-
ments in the absence of evidence of clear unconstitutionality, then ambiguity in statutory meaning can be one 
reason why a statute might not be clearly unconstitutional.” Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The 
Presumption of Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1731 (2013). 
11 The avoidance canon’s most natural use is in resolving conflicts between statutes and the Constitution. While 
there may be other uses of the canon, this Article’s scope is limited to the process of construction that takes 
place when a vague or hopelessly ambiguous constitutional provision meets a statute.  
 
172 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 43:2] 
and others at the founding, along with two early Supreme Court cases, support the 
proposition that the classical avoidance canon should appropriately be deployed as 
an aspect of good-faith constitutional construction.  Part III seeks to incorporate the 
views of James Bradley Thayer to draw the point that allowing judges to attempt to 
ascertain the “spirit” of a provision, as a remedy to clarify vague constitutional “in-
structions,” is not supported by agency principles, nor by views held at the founding.  
Part IV proposes that the classical avoidance canon should be deployed as a tool in 
constitutional construction, but only when dueling semantic interpretations are in true 
or relative equipoise.  This also functions as a limiting principle for the use of the 
classical avoidance canon.  
 
PART I: THE INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION DICHOTOMY 
 Interpretation and construction “correspond to two different moments in the 
process of any decision controlled by an authoritative legal text.”12  “New” Original-
ists generally agree that determining the communicative content—the semantic 
meaning—of a text requires resort to the original public meaning of the words.13  This 
methodology separates New Originalism from “Old” Originalism; the latter seeks to 
determine semantic meaning through evidence of the writer’s communicative in-
tent.14 
  Yet, New Originalism finds itself at odds over how to treat what has been 
labeled “construction.”  Allan Farnsworth’s distinction between ambiguity and 
vagueness sets the stage for distinguishing between semantic interpretation and ap-
plicative interpretation (construction).  Ambiguity, as he defines it, arrives when “a 
word may . . . have two entirely different connotations so that it may be applied to an 
object and be at the same time both clearly appropriate and inappropriate.”15  Ambi-
guity can often—but not always—be resolved by resorting to interpretive methods, 
such as by turning to sources that explicate the original public meaning of a text, or 
by turning to legislative history.  
 Vagueness operates differently.  As Farnsworth explains, vagueness prob-
lems arise when we’re faced with a text or word “that may or may not be applicable 
to marginal objects.”16  It is in the realm of vagueness that so-called “constitutional 
construction”—the application of semantic meaning to particular cases—becomes 
crucial.  When faced with vague provisions, “[t] he original meaning of the text does 
not definitively answer [the problem].”17  Something else—what has been dubbed 
 
12 Richard Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the Complete Constitution, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
ONLINE 1 (forthcoming 2017) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2778744  
13 Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 599, 609-10 (2004).  
14 See Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential 
Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013) (“new originalists maintain that the proper target of originalist interpre-
tation is the original public meaning of the constitutional text, as opposed to the Framers' or ratifiers' intentions 
or expectations.”). 
15 E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953 (1967).  
16 Id.  
17 Barnett, supra note 3 at 69. 
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applicative interpretation, or “construction”18—must fill the void. Construction also 
plays a role when the meaning of a word is irreducibly ambiguous.19  When faced 
with problems of vagueness or irreducible ambiguity, the process of construction20 
takes place.  As Jack Balkin21 framed the matter, during construction “[w]e look to 
underlying principles because when the text uses relatively abstract and general con-
cepts, we must know which principles the text presumes or is attempting to em-
brace.”22  
 Substantive canons are vital to the process of construction: “[s]ubstantive 
canons are canons of construction—they determine legal effect and not linguistic 
meaning.”23  And of all the substantive canons—and there are plenty24—the consti-
tutional avoidance canon seems to have an extra cachet these days, in light of Chief 
Justice Roberts’ use of the canon in NFIB v. Sebelius.25  There are several forms of 
the avoidance canon, which generally track one another albeit with sight distinctions.  
The two most cited versions of the canon are the “modern” and “classical” avoidance 
canons.26  The so-called “modern” avoidance canon counsels that  “a statute should 
be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.”27  In this 
sense, it is a prophylactic rule.  The classical avoidance canon differs from the mod-
ern version insofar as the former posits that one plausible interpretation of a statute 
would be unconstitutional whereas the latter merely posits that a plausible interpre-
tation may be unconstitutional.  The traditional formulation of the classical avoidance 
canon is, “as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it 
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, the Court's plain duty is to adopt 
that which will save the Act.”28 
 There is a fairly wide array of ideas on what principles judges should look 
to when constructing the constitutional text in relation to a statute.  Jack Balkin cites 
separation of powers, the principle of democracy, social mores and legal precedent.29  
 
18 See Barnett, supra note 3 at 69 (“Although I begin by offering definitions of interpretation and construction, 
the labels are not important. Both activities could be called ‘interpretation’—for example, something like ‘se-
mantic interpretation’ and ‘applicative interpretation.’”). 
19 See Solum, supra note 7, at 458 (“[I]n other cases, the constitutional text does not provide determinate an-
swers to constitutional questions. For example, the text may be vague or irreducibly ambiguous. We can call 
this domain of constitutional underdeterminacy ‘the construction zone.’”).  
20 This paper uses the term “construction” throughout, although the term “applicative interpretation” would 
work equally well. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 69.  
21 Balkin is not one who is readily identified with the originalist movement. However, in his recent scholarship, 
he has acknowledged that originalism is the proper process by which to engage in interpretation, while “living 
constitutionalism” is actually a form of constitutional construction. See Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism 
and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2009). For a full-fledged description of his 
originalism approach to interpretation, and his “living constitutionalism” approach to construction, see JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
22 Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 306 (2007). 
23 Solum, supra note 7, at 510. 
24 Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner identify dozens of substantive canons. See generally, SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 6.  
25 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
26 See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997). 
27 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 247. 
28 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
29 Balkin, supra note 22, at 306. Balkin also cites to other factors that he deems important in determining a 
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Keith Whittington argues that the process of construction should take place in the 
political branches: judges should be constrained to semantic interpretation.30  Randy 
Barnett—not a newcomer to the debate over construction31— and Evan Bernick have 
a forthcoming paper entitled “The Letter and the Spirit: A Theory of Good Faith Con-
stitutional Construction.”32  As Bernick states, their paper elaborates on the notion 
that “where the letter gives out, the law does not—and neither does judicial duty . . . 
[judges] are legally bound to act consistently with not only the letter of the Constitu-
tion—its text—but its spirit . . . they must have recourse to the spirit of the law in 
formulating rules of construction.”33   
 Barnett and Bernick make the case for what they call “good faith constitu-
tional construction.”  That is, when in the “construction zone,”34 judges should resort 
to the spirit of the constitutional provision at issue, but be thoughtful, diligent, and 
honest when doing so.35 
 The under-determinacy36 of vague or irreducibly ambiguous constitutional 
provisions reveals a cleavage in originalist thinking that Barnett and Bernick, two 
committed public-meaning originalists, are right to try to corral with a firm set of 
principles that entail good faith construction.  
 Nonetheless, they have dismissed what should be regarded as a basic tenet 
of any theory of good faith construction: the classical avoidance canon.  This paper 
seeks to make the case that the classical avoidance canon has a strong affirmative 
role to play in any theory of constitutional construction.  Unlike John McGinnis, who 
sets forth an impressive history of the judicial power37 requiring a “duty of clarity” 
before invalidating a statute,38 this paper acknowledges and agrees with Barnett & 
 
constitutional construction—eleven factors in all, according to Kay. See Kay, supra note 12, at 11-12.  
30 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). Whittington still seems to subscribe to this view, although he now acknowledges that 
courts have a role to play in construction, albeit a secondary one. Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional Inter-
pretation/construction Distinction: A Useful Fiction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 76-77 (2010) (citing KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2007)).   
31 Barnett has been a major player in the development of the interpretation-construction distinction. See, e.g., 
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 5 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); RANDY E. BARNETT, RE-
STORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2005). 
32 Randy E. Barnett, 2017 Originalism Works in Progress Conference Roster, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 5, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/10/05/2017-originalism-works-in-
progress-conference-roster/?utm_term=.921b361d5ce1; see also Randy E. Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Letter 
and the Spirit: The Judicial Duty of Good-Faith Constitutional Construction, GEO. L. FACULTY PUBLICA-
TIONS AND OTHER WORKS, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1946.  
33 Evan Bernick, Deciding Unclear Originalist Cases: Towards Good-Faith Constitutional Construction, THE 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Dec. 19, 2016) http://www.fed-soc.org/blog/detail/deciding-unclear-originalist-
cases-towards-good-faith-constitutional-construction.  
34 The “construction zone” refers to the act of construction—that is, the “activity of giving legal effect to [se-
mantic] meaning”. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 32, at 1-2.  
35 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 32, at 39 (“As noted above, the inquiry is empirical, and empirical inquiries 
can be evaluated with reference to the rigor of the method through which evidence is collected, the presentation 
of that evidence, and the persuasiveness of arguments made on the basis of that evidence.”).  
36 It is worth noting that vagueness in semantic meaning results in an underdeterminate application—not an 
indeterminate application. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 32, at 7 (“Underdeterminacy—not to be confused 
with indeterminacy—can result where the text is vague or ambiguous.”).   
37 U.S. CONST. ART. III. 
38 See McGinnis, supra note 5, at 843(“The judicial duty of clarity also suggests that the judiciary can engage 
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Bernick, and others,39 that the “construction zone” exists, and that scholars, judges 
and practitioners would be wise to coalesce around a coherent theory of construction 
that restrains judicial freewheeling.  However, Barnett and Bernick too readily dis-
miss the classical avoidance canon as a principle of construction. 
 
PART II: THE CLASSICAL AVOIDANCE CANON DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 
 Constitutional history supports the use of the classical avoidance canon dur-
ing construction.  This is demonstrated through analysis of historical conceptions of 
the judicial power and several early Supreme Court cases that utilize the avoidance 
canon during the construction phase. 
A. Hamilton’s Pitch for Judicial Restraint in Federalist 78 
 In response to John McGinnis’ historical argument—namely, the array of 
historical materials that he summons as support for the proposition that judges should 
not lightly declare a statute unconstitutional40—Barnett and Bernick choose to inter-
pret these historical conceptions of the Article III power differently.41  The main 
source of disagreement surrounds Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in The Federalist 
Papers. 
 In Federalist 78, Hamilton argues quite explicitly that judges should require 
an “irreconciliable variance” between a statutory text and a Constitutional provision 
before invalidating a statute: 
 
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fun-
damental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as 
well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative 
body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between 
the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of 
course, to be preferred.42 
 
 In the same piece, Hamilton writes that the role of the Court “must be to 
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void.”43  The empha-
sis in his writing, of course, is that some higher threshold of unconstitutionality must 
be determined—not simply a bare majority of the evidence.  
 Barnett and Bernick, however, dismiss this portion of Federalist 78 as “not 
properly understood as part of a response to Anti-Federalist concerns about arbitrary 
 
only in interpretation, not construction, during the course of judicial review”).  
39 Other scholars to have embraced the interpretation-construction distinction include Keith Whittington, Larry 
Solum, and Jack Balkin. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying discussion. 
40 See generally McGinnis, supra note 5, at 867-98. 
41 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 57-58. 
42 Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (June 14, 1788) available at http://www.constitu-
tion.org/fed/federa78.htm (emphasis added). 
43 Id. 
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judicial power.”44  Rather, Barnett and Bernick point to Hamilton’s argument in Fed-
eralist 78 about procedural rules and precedent as being the direct response to Anti-
Federalist concern about arbitrary judicial power.45  
 Instead, Barnett and Bernick tell us to look at Federalist 81 in order to get a 
more accurate flavor of Hamilton’s views on constitutional interpretation.  “It is in 
Federalist 81 that Hamilton addressed Anti-Federalist concerns about arbitrary judi-
cial power most directly.”46  They argue that in Federalist 81, Hamilton cabined ju-
dicial power by pointing to its relative weakness vis-à-vis lack of force.  Thus, insti-
tutional weakness, and not a presumption of constitutionality (as indicated in 
Federalist 78 with his “irreconcilable variance” note) was Hamilton’s retort to the 
Anti-Federalist’s charge of judicial supremacy.  “Crucially,” Barnett and Bernick 
write, “Hamilton did not here [in Federalist 81] mention a requirement of clarity.”47  
 And yet, Federalist 81 contains precisely the same presumption of constitu-
tionality that Hamilton voiced in Federalist 78: 
 
The Constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws, 
and that wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to give 
place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not deducible from any 
circumstance peculiar to the plan of the convention, but from the general 
theory of a limited Constitution.48  
 
 The key phrases—“irreconcilable variance,” “manifest,” and “evident”—all 
point in the same direction: a statute must be clearly unconstitutional, and not argua-
bly unconstitutional, for the Court to void it.  
 By Barnett and Bernick’s own framing of the issue, Federalist 81—presum-
ably Hamilton’s direct counterargument to the Anti-Federalist clamor against judicial 
fiat—invokes a presumption of constitutionality as a way to neuter judicial policy-
making.  
 Moreover, Hamilton’s argument evokes the classical avoidance canon, 
which instructs judges to disregard even the most natural reading of a statute if such 
reading would violate the constitution and there exists another reasonable alternative 
reading.49  Hamilton proceeds similarly, laying out three steps for a fulsome interpre-
tation of a statute.  First, a court must decide on the statute’s semantic meaning.50  
Next, a court should compare that meaning to the constitutional text at issue.51  Fi-
nally, only if there is “manifest” or “evident” opposition between the two should the 
 
44 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 58. 
45 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 58 (“Hamilton did seek to address those [Anti-Federalist] concerns. In 
Federalist 78, however, he did so only by referring to ‘strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and 
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.’ The requirement of clarity is referenced 
earlier in the essay.”). 
46 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 58. 
47 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 58. 
48 See Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (June 28, 1788), available at http://www.constitu-
tion.org/fed/federa81.htm. 
49 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 250 (2d ed. 2010). See 
Part IV of this Article for a further discussion on what qualifies as a “reasonable” alternative reading.  
50 See Alexander Hamilton, supra note 42 (“It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning.”). 
51 See id. (“If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two. . .”). 
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law be invalidated.52  The classical avoidance canon utilizes the same first two 
steps.53  The third step of the classical avoidance canon—choosing the interpretation 
that saves an act—is an outgrowth of Hamilton’s argument that only an “irreconcil-
able variance” should render a statute unconstitutional.  When a jurist is faced with 
“two possible interpretations of a statute, one of which it would be unconstitutional 
and by the other valid,”54 the “plain duty”55 of the jurist, as Hamilton would likely 
agree in Federalist 78 and 81, is to adopt the saving construction of the statute.  
 Hamilton locates his presumption of constitutionality not in any particular 
text of the Constitution, but in “the general theory of a limited Constitution.”  Crucial 
to that theory of a limited Constitution—a part of the spirit of the Constitution, if you 
will—was the avoidance principle.56   
B. The Brutus Question 
 There is one more point about history that is worth dwelling over.  In ex-
plaining Hamilton’s motivations and arguments in both Federalist 78 and Federalist 
81, Barnett and Bernick explain that Hamilton was responding directly to Anti-Fed-
eralist accusations.  According to Barnett and Bernick, “Hamilton’s references to a 
presumption of constitutionality in Federalist 78 are not properly understood as part 
of a response to Anti-Federalist concerns about arbitrary judicial power.”57  Rather, 
as noted above, Federalist 81 was his response to that charge.  The specific charge 
that Hamilton was pushing back against was Brutus’ argument that “this power in the 
judicial [branch] will enable them to mould the government, into any shape they 
please.”58  
 The question becomes, to what is Brutus referring to when he writes, “this 
power in the judicial [branch]”?  Barnett and Bernick supply an answer: “[Anti-Fed-
eralists] feared federal judges would “mould the government” by being more defer-
ential to assertions of federal power.”59  This conclusion seems dubious.  To be fair, 
Brutus is not a model of clarity in XI.  In one, albeit different sense, Brutus seems to 
support the core of the Barnett and Bernick thesis—Brutus stipulates that the judici-
ary is empowered to have recourse to the spirit of the Constitution, and not simply its 
 
52 See id. (“[T]hat which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred.”). 
53 See T.J. Fosko, Constitutional Law —Statutory Interpretation —Avoiding the Unavoidable: The Canon of 
Constitutional Avoidance As Applied to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 591, 596 (2013) (arguing that the three steps are (1) determining the meaning of the text (2) 
determining if that meaning would result in unconstitutionality of the statute and (3) applying the savings con-
struction if a reasonable alternative exists).  
54 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). 
55 Id. 
56 Barnett and Bernick explicitly accept the spirit of the Constitution as a guiding principle of good-faith con-
stitutional construction. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 72 (“Our thesis is that there are contexts in 
which judicial recourse to the spirit of this Constitution is not only proper but necessary.”). On this basis, then, 
Hamilton’s argument, sounding in functionality & structure, should be relevant to their theory.  
57 Id. at 58. 
58 See id.; see also BRUTUS, XI, CONST. SOC’Y (Jan. 31, 1788), available at http://www.constitu-
tion.org/afp/brutus11.htm. 
59 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 58. 
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letter.60  But continuing on in the piece, and closer to the part about “”mould[ing] the 
government” Brutus registers an inimitably grave fear with the judiciary61—that 
power corrupts, and as such, the “same principle will influence them to extend their 
power, and increase their rights; this of itself will operate strongly upon the courts to 
give such a meaning to the constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as 
will enlarge the sphere of their own authority.”62 
 It is this lead-in to the concern about “mould[ing] the government” that has 
prompted several commentators to assume, as the plain language seems to convey, 
that Brutus was concerned about the judiciary being corrupted by power and using 
the broad strokes of the Constitution to further their own political agenda.63  Further, 
Brutus’ letter “XV” lends additional support to this understanding.  In XV, Brutus 
writes that the people, not judges—whom he feared would be corrupted—should be 
the ultimate arbiters of whether a stated policy runs afoul of the Constitution: 
 
[I]f the rulers break the compact, the people have a right and ought to 
remove them . . . those whom the people chuse . . . should have the 
power in the last resort to determine the sense of the compact . . . but 
when this power is lodged in the hands of men independent of the peo-
ple, and of their representatives, and who are not, constitutionally, ac-
countable for their opinions, no way is left to controul them but with a 
high hand and an outstretched arm.64 
 
 It seems dubious, then, that Brutus’ concern about the judiciary molding the 
government was actually a concern about the judiciary being too deferential to the 
government.  Rather, Brutus’ concern was that unelected judges, given life tenure, 
would foreclose questions of policy by shrouding them in the protective cocoon of 
the Constitution’s broad and sometimes vague clauses.65  
C. The Debates Over the Council of Revision 
 The debate over—and failure of—a proposed Council of Revision during 
the Constitutional Convention further shows that Alexander Hamilton’s views on 
 
60 BRUTUS, supra note 58 (“By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning 
spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.”).  
61 Brutus also registered this same fear a few weeks letter, in XV. See BRUTUS, XV, CONST. SOC’Y (Mar. 
20, 1788), available at http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus15.htm (“[I]n short, they are independent of the 
people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven...[m]en placed in this situation will generally soon 
feel themselves independent of heaven itself.”).  
62 BRUTUS, supra note 58. 
63 See ANTHONY ARTHUR PEACOCK, FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW 77 (2009). 
64 BRUTUS, supra note 61. 
65 For further support of this reading of Brutus, see, e.g., WILLIAM F. CONNELLY JR., JAMES MADISON RULES 
AMERICA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF CONGRESSIONAL PARTISANSHIP 89-90 (2011) (explaining how 
the Anti-Federalists were deeply distrustful of the judiciary, especially the power of judicial review, and citing 
to the Brutus quote from XI for support); David Forte, Appealing to Judge’s Better Angels, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (Feb. 19, 2009) (citing the Brutus quote from XI and stating, “[t]he words of the faction that lost 
the battle of the Constitution sound prophetic to us today . . . [d]id Hamilton truly believe that men in robes 
would act differently from men in frock coats? Was not Brutus's assessment of human nature more realistic?”). 
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constitutional avoidance were very much within the mainstream among the founding 
class.  
1.  Three Votes, Three Failures 
 On May 29, 1787, the Virginia Plan was formally proposed to the Constitu-
tional Convention in Philadelphia.66  Included within the Virginia Plan was a pro-
posal designed to curb legislative excess.  The “Council of Revision,” as it was called, 
was proposed as a body of executive and judicial officers that would wield a veto—
similar to the Presidential veto enjoyed today—over acts of legislation passed by 
Congress.67  The Council of Revision had long been important to Madison,68 as it 
served as a further check upon power. Generally, he thought that no department—
including the judiciary—had the authority to solely determine the contours of the 
Constitution.69  
 The Council of Revision was proposed to the Convention delegates on June 
4, July 21 and August 15, failing each time to garner a majority of votes from the 
states.  Nonetheless, the debates over the Council are instructive, especially on the 
delegates’ views of judicial duty.   
 James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania and future Justice of the Su-
preme Court stated in support of the Council, “[l]aws may be unjust, may be unwise, 
may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify 
the Judges in refusing to give them effect.”70  He backed the Council precisely be-
cause he did not believe the Constitution otherwise gave judges carte blanche to in-
validate duly enacted legislation. George Mason, who also supported the Council, 
reiterated this view.  Judges, he stated, “could declare an unconstitutional law void. 
But with regard to every law however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not 
come plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to 
give it a free course.”71  James Madison stated that the Council “would be useful to 
the Judiciary depart[men]t by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself 
[against] Legislative encroachments.”72  Madison’s statement is interesting—envi-
sioning an already existing role for the judiciary (hence his reference to “additional” 
opportunity”) in countering the legislature, but acknowledging that the current frame-
work didn’t go far enough.   
 
66 The Virginia Plan, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF CONST. CONVENTION (originally published May 29, 
1787), available at https://ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=7.  
67 James T. Barry III, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235 
(1989) (“The proposed Council would have vested the federal veto power in an institution composed of the 
President and several members of the federal judiciary, presumably the Justices of the Supreme Court.”). 
68 See id. at 244 (“James Madison, the chief architect of the proposed national Council of Revision, expressed 
his admiration of the New York Council [of Revision].”). 
69 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 520 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (quoting Madison as stating, “[t]here is not one Govern-
ment on the face of the earth . . . in which provision is made for a particular authority to determine the limits of 
the Constitutional division of power between the branches of the Government.”). 
70 Neal Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1725 (1998) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FED. CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max Farrand ed., 1923)). 
71 THE RECORDS OF THE FED. CONVENTION OF 1787, at 323 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/v1ch10s10.html.  
72 Id. at 322. 
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 Elbridge Gerry stood in steadfast opposition to the Council.  Gerry believed, 
in contrast to Wilson (and perhaps, similar to Madison), that the Constitution gave 
judges a limited power of judicial review, “as [judges] will have a sufficient check 
[against] encroachments . . . by their exposition of the laws.”73  Nonetheless, he did 
not wish to expand this power of review by placing judges on the Council.  Gerry 
stated that “[i]t was quite foreign from the nature of [the judicial] office to make them 
judges of the policy of public measures.”  He set forth a clear line of demarcation. 
Judges should not hesitate to “set aside laws as being [against] the Constitution,” 
which was done in some states “with general approbation.”  However, they should 
not sit on a Council of Revision, as that would vest them with power to set public 
policy. Particularly illuminating for this Article, Gerry stated bluntly that “[the Coun-
cil of Revision] was making Statesmen of the Judges; and setting them up as the 
guardians of the Rights of the people . . . [rather] the Representatives of the people 
[are] the guardians of their Rights & interests.”74  
2.  What the Failures of the Council of Revision Highlighted 
The debates over the Council of Revision are interesting insofar as the propo-
nents of the measure (Wilson, Mason, Madison) and the opponents of the measure 
(Gerry) agree on a fundamental premise: the judiciary had a limited role under the 
Constitutional scheme.  The supporters of the Council sought to expand the Judici-
ary’s role beyond what was contemplated, and the detractors sought to keep the Ju-
diciary within their contemplated role.  
 This forms a neat contrast with the fundamental anchor of the Barnett & 
Bernick theory of construction, which states in part, “[w]here the letter of the law 
does not yield a clear answer, [judges] must have recourse to the spirit of the law in 
formulating rules of construction.”  Their principle of construction centers on the idea 
that the judiciary must be, in Bernick’s words: 
 
[A]n impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
legislative or executive. The judiciary cannot perform that vital function 
if judges do not impartially evaluate and, when proper, invalidate legis-
lation, even in controversial and consequential cases. We can have a ju-
diciary that reflexively defers to the political branches or we can have 
constitutionally limited government—but we cannot have both.75 
 
 Gerry’s statement that “the Representatives of the people,” and not the judi-
ciary, are “the guardians of their Rights & interests”76 brings this premise into ques-
tion.  Gerry did not seem to view the judiciary as a “bulwark” against assumption of 
power and undermining of rights; he vested that responsibility in elected representa-
tives.77  Moreover, the general sentiment among the founders with regard to the 
 
73 Id. at 320. 
74 Id. at 322.  
75 Evan Bernick, Cruz vs. the Court: Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Join His Crusade, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-bernick/cruz-vs-the-court-why-con_b_7936498.html.  
76 See THE RECORDS OF THE FED. CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 71, at 322. 
77 This suspicion of “judicial authoritarianism” couched as constitutional protectionism has a well-worn history. 
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proper judicial role seems to embody some form of deference (with varying degrees) 
to the legislature.  Wilson’s admonition that “[l]aws may be unjust, may be unwise . 
. . and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them 
effect”78 arguably locates the classical avoidance canon79 in the judicial role.   
D.  Constitutional Avoidance and the Marshall Court 
 Consistent with the views of the framers, the use of the classical avoidance 
canon as a canon of construction followed in short order at the United States Supreme 
Court. 
1. Mossman v. Higginson  
In 1800 in Mossman v. Higginson, the Court was faced with the application of 
Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to Article III of the Constitution.80 Higginson, 
a British citizen, was suing to foreclose on his property in Georgia.81  The citizenship 
of the defendant, whom Higginson was foreclosing on, was not stated in the plead-
ings.  Under Section 11, circuit courts were permitted jurisdiction “where . . . an alien 
is a party.”  The question reaching the Court was whether Section 11 would permit 
the suit to proceed, despite the Article III prohibition on such jurisdiction (limiting 
suits involving aliens to suits between a citizen and an alien, and not suits between 
two aliens).82  The Court dismissed the suit, and applied a familiar version of the 
classical avoidance canon.  Reasoning that the Judiciary Act of 1789 “must re-
ceive a construction, consistent with the constitution”83 and implicitly recognizing 
that the statute, as written, would contravene a clear constitutional limit on jurisdic-
tion in Article III, the Court constructed the statute as consistent with Article III.  
Despite the clear import of the clashing meanings of Article III and Section 11, the 
Court nonetheless, in an act of construction (i.e., applicative interpretation), read Sec-
tion 11 to be consistent with Article III.   As the Court stated in a brief opinion, 
“[Section 11] says, it is true, in general terms, that the Circuit Court shall have cog-
nizance of suits ‘where an alien is a party;’ but . . . we must so expound the terms of 
the law, as to meet the case, ‘where, indeed, an alien is one party,’ but a citizen is the 
other.”84  The Court recognized that the semantic interpretation of Section 11 was 
 
See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 20 (1990) (describing the debate between Justices Chase 
and Iredell in Calder v. Bull and noting that “the impulse to judicial authoritarianism surfaced and was resisted 
at the beginning of constitutional history.”).  
78 Katyal, supra note 70, at 1725. 
79 Wilson’s statement arguably evokes the classical conception of the avoidance canon, insofar as his statement 
presumes that a statute has been interpreted in a way that would raise constitutional concerns (as opposed to a 
avoiding interpreting a statute in a way that may raise constitutional concerns).  
80 4 U.S. 12 (1800). 
81 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, 
29–30 (1985). 
82 See U.S. CONST. ART. III. § 2 (limiting jurisdiction “between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign 
states, citizens or subjects.”).  
83 Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. 12, 14 (1800). 
84 Mossman, 4 U.S. at 14. 
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generally straightforward: “[Section 11] says, it is true, in general terms, that the Cir-
cuit Court shall have cognizance of suits . . .”85  Yet, at the point of applicative inter-
pretation—of construction—the court harmonized Section 11 and Article III.  This 
sort of gap-filling is a quintessential role of construction.  As Larry Solum pointed 
out, “[f]or example, it is at least theoretically possible that a legal text could contain 
gaps or contradiction . . .  if there were a constitutional issue on which the [legislative] 
text was silent, then a construction might fill the gap.”86  Mossman seems to be an 
early example of the Court using the classical avoidance canon (i.e., that Section 11 
“must receive a construction, consistent with the constitution”) as a principle of con-
struction.  
2. McCulloch v. Maryland 
 McCulloch v. Maryland stands as another example of an early case where 
the classical avoidance canon was deployed as a canon of construction.87  McCulloch, 
of course, centered on the constitutionality of the Second National Bank, chartered 
by Congress shortly after the War of 1812.  The Maryland legislature, in its bid to 
effectively destroy the bank, passed a law levying taxes on all bank branches “not 
chartered by the legislature.”88  Both the Supremacy Clause of Article IV, and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, were implicated.89 
 Chief Justice Marshall was faced, first, with a problem of semantic interpre-
tation: how to define the word “necessary.”  Turning to find the original public mean-
ing of the word, Chief Justice Marshall looked to the use of the word “necessary,” 
“in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors.”90  Engaging in a form 
of intra-textualism, Marshall also compared the use of the phrase “absolutely neces-
sary” in Article I, Section 10,91 to the use of the word “necessary” in Article I, Section 
8, to make the point that the word has various degrees of meaning: as the Chief Justice 
put it, “[a] thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably nec-
essary.”92 
  As Barnett and Bernick state, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that these 
sources revealed that the word, “frequently imports no more than that one thing is 
convenient, or useful, or essential to another.”93  Thus, Chief Justice Marshall had 
purported to resolve what the semantic meaning of the word “necessary” in Article I, 
Section 8 was. 
 
85 Id.  
86 Solum, supra note 2, at 107. 
87 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  
88Id. at 318 (“[A]nd that there was passed on the 11th day of February 1818, by the general assembly of Mary-
land, an act, entitled, ‘an act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the state of Maryland, not 
chartered by the legislature”). 
89 See U.S. CONST. ART. IV; U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8. 
90 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413. 
91 See U.S. CONST. ART. I § 10 (Prohibiting states from levying “‘imposts, or duties on imports or exports, 
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.”).  
92 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414. 
93 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 414 (1819).  
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 However, Marshall reached his destination in a more abstruse fashion.  In 
fact, Marshall appears to have had a rather difficult time concluding that the meaning 
of the word necessary was simply “that one thing is convenient, or useful.”  Marshall 
does make such a statement after surveying sources bearing on the original public 
meaning of the word (“approved authors” and other instances where the word is used 
in “common affairs”).  Nonetheless, if Chief Justice Marshall had reached his con-
clusion at that point, the analysis could have stopped.  Yet, the Chief Justice continues 
on, burnishing his conclusion with further evidence by comparing uses of the word 
“necessary” in other sections of the Constitution.  Importantly, Marshall concludes 
the paragraph by stating that “[t]his word, then, like others, is used in various senses; 
and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using 
them, are all to be taken into view.”94 
 The clear import of the linearity of Marshall’s argument seems to suggest 
that he used the original public meaning as one way to wrestle ambiguity out of the 
word “necessary.”  Nonetheless, in Marshall’s view, the original public meaning 
could still not definitively draw all of the contours of the word.  Thus, his use of the 
word “if” at the start of the sentence describing that “if reference be had [to public 
meaning sources]” connotes a view that the original public meaning of “necessary” 
was not completely dispositive.  Moreover, Marshall continues struggling with the 
meaning of the word, admitting that the “taken in [its] rigorous sense, [“necessary”] 
would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously intended.  It is es-
sential to just construction, that many words which import something excessive, 
should be understood in a more mitigated sense—in that sense which common usage 
justifies.  The word ‘necessary’ is of this description.”95 
 Thus begins Part II of McCullough.  Part II is Chief Justice Marshall’s need 
to engage in construction: whether the act chartering the Second Bank of Congress 
was covered by his understanding of the word “necessary.”  And what we see is Mar-
shall engaging in a form of construction very much anchored in principles of avoid-
ance.  The thrust of Marshall’s argument is that the Constitution would be very odd 
indeed if, buried in a section detailing the powers of Congress, the Necessary and 
Proper clause existed as an awesome limitation on Congress’ power—constraining 
the Congress to only pass laws that were indispensable to their other, enumerated 
powers.96  Besides these sort of structural and consequentialist concerns, Marshall 
otherwise is unable to locate other compelling reasons, besides the original public 
meaning sources, for his conclusion that necessary means convenient.  Effectively, 
Marshall is stuck with what appears to be irreducible ambiguity.  But he uses, as a 
tiebreaker, what can only be termed a form of constitutional avoidance: 
 
If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is 
found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate 
on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the 
constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble.97 
 
94 Id. at 415. 
95 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414. 
96 See id. at 420.  
97 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 420–21 (emphasis added).  
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 Marshall says that, if no other reason can be found in favor of restricting the 
clause, then we must construe it in favor of Congress. Uncomfortable with his argu-
ment about the clarity of the original public meaning of the word (perhaps, due in 
part, to his acknowledgement that the “rigorous” meaning of “necessary” was closer 
to indispensable than convenient)98 and unable to latch onto any other reasons besides 
consequentialist ones, Marshall simply applies a tiebreaker: favoring the interpreta-
tion of the provision that the legislative branch (Congress) has proffered.  In finding 
himself balanced somewhat evenly between the constitutionality and unconstitution-
ality of the chartering of the Second Bank, Chief Justice Marshall blinked in favor of 
the statute’s constitutionality.  In getting to that point, he used notions of constitu-
tional avoidance as a principle of constitutional construction.  
 
PART III: THAYERIANISM AND THE CLASSICAL AVOIDANCE CANON 
 James Bradley Thayer casts an outsized shadow over the question of whether 
the classical avoidance canon should play a principal role in constitutional construc-
tion.  Several of the theorists mentioned earlier, including Larry Solum, view 
“Thayerianism [a]s best understood as a distinctive approach to constitutional con-
struction and a way of proceeding in the construction zone.”99  Yet, Solum admits 
that while he has not argued against Thayerianism100 as a principle of construction, 
he “ha[s] not endorsed such a principle either.”101  In this Part, this Article argues that 
while Thayerianism102—especially its “not open to rational question” standard— sets 
the bar for unconstitutionality much too high,103 its theoretical underpinnings cast 
doubt on whether agency and fiduciary law, as Barnett and Bernick propose, is truly 
the best lens through which to analyze the contours of the judicial power.  
 
98 See supra note 92 and accompanying discussion. 
99 Solum, supra note 23, at 523. 
100 Solum defines Thayerianism as “when the meaning of the text is unclear or uncertain, then judges should 
defer to decisions made by the political branches. Thus, in a case where the requirements of equal protection 
are unclear (because of vagueness, for example), judges should refrain from declaring legislative or executive 
action unconstitutional.” Solum, supra note 23, at 473.  
101 Solum, supra note 23, at 473.  
102 As drawn from James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).  
103 For example, John McGinnis, who agrees that the judicial power encompasses some aspects of deference 
(such as a “duty of clarity”), finds that Thayer’s standard sets the bar too high. See McGinnis, supra note 5 at 
847 (“Against Thayer’s conception of deference, the position offered here argues that his doctrine of clear 
mistake stems from a misunderstanding of the jurisprudence in the early Republic.”).  
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A. Thayerianism and the Republican Tradition 
 Thayer’s general thesis104— that the Court should not invalidate federal leg-
islation105 unless unconstitutionality is “so clear it is not open to rational ques-
tion”106—is arguably107 supported in the historical record.  Thayer himself discusses 
a litany of late 18th century and early 19th century cases that invoke some sort of 
“clear” or “manifest” unconstitutionality standard.108  
 Moreover, Thayer’s position is an outgrowth of both Federalist and Repub-
lican positions held at the time of the founding.  As demonstrated in Part II,109 “both 
Republicans and Federalists expected courts to use restraint in exercising judicial re-
view.”110  For Republicans especially, to the extent the law was not unconstitutional 
beyond dispute, “Republicans said the courts should leave the decision to those who 
had primary responsibility for deciding: the People themselves.”111  Courts were 
agents of the people, in the Republican view and “[w]hen they declared legislation 
void for being unconstitutional, they were acting in a manner they presumed their 
principal had commanded . . . such presumptuousness was not to be indulged lightly 
. . .”112  Federalists, while also embracing judicial deference, did so for different rea-
sons.  Rather than viewing courts as agents of the people, the Federalists believed 
“restraint or deference was a matter of prudence and political expediency: something 
necessary to secure and preserve judicial (rather than popular) authority by minimiz-
ing the risks of overstepping.”113  
 Thayerianism fits well within the Republican tradition of judicial deference.  
Thayer locates the power of judicial review as a secondary check on legislative ex-
cess: “it is always to be remembered that the judicial question is a secondary one.”114  
This is because the “judicial duty now in question touches the region of political ad-
ministration.”115  Because judicial duty, through judicial review, touches on political 
administration, “the standard of duty to which the courts bring legislative Acts . . . 
[is] their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to another department which 
the constitution has charged with the duty of making it.”116  
 
104 As argued in Thayer, supra note 102. 
105 Thayer makes it clear in The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law that federal 
review of state legislation should not be judged by the “clear error” standard. See id. (“[W]hen the question is 
whether State action be or be not conformable to the paramount constitution, the supreme law of the land, we 
have a different matter in hand.”).  
106 Thayer, supra note 102, at 144. 
107 For the argument that Thayer’s thesis is grounded in a post-founding, politicized understanding of the judi-
ciary, see generally McGinnis, supra note 5, at 904-08. 
108 See Thayer, supra note 102, at 133-37.  
109 See supra Part II.C and accompanying discussion. 
110 Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 621 (2012). 
111 Id. at 625. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 626. This argument inheres in Bickel’s endorsement of “passive virtues.” See generally, ALEXANDER 
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).   
114 Thayer, supra note 102, at 148. 
115 Id. at 152. 
116 Id. at 144. 
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 Thayer’s theory thus seems premised on the idea that the judicial check—
not a “full and complete” check but merely a “partial” one117— requires a level of 
deference to the legislature insofar as the legislature, not the courts, are imbued with 
“the duty of making [legislation].”118  To the extent a law is not unconstitutional be-
yond reasonable doubt, the legislature—the vessel of the People—has authority to 
interpret the Constitution within a range of reasonableness.  “The constitution does 
not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range 
of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.”119  Thayer’s argu-
ment thus sounds in similar terms as the Republican’s argument: the People, through 
their elected representatives, have authority to determine the constitutionality of their 
enactments, within the borders of the constitution that the judiciary fixes.120  To do 
otherwise would be to steal sovereignty from the body politic and couch it in the 
black robes of the judiciary.  This argument is of course quite similar to the argument 
that Brutus advanced in XI and XV.121 
 This rendition of Thayerianism—both its place as inhering in the Republican 
tradition of the judicial role, and as an early enunciation of the classical avoidance 
canon—works against the Barnett & Bernick thesis that classical avoidance has no 
role to play in constitutional construction.  Barnett, in a recent book, specifically ar-
gues that Thayer’s theory has no role to play in constitutional construction because 
Thayer “framed the judicial power to nullify laws” in the vision of a “concern for the 
will of the people” as opposed to “as a means by which the rights retained by the 
sovereign people are protected from their servants.”122  In this vein, Barnett chides 
Thayer for adhering to “Democratic Constitutionalism”—the will of the majority—
as opposed to “Republican Constitutionalism,” which centers on individual rights of 
the People.123  Barnett and Bernick are not willing to grant any measure of defer-
ence—let alone clear error— to the legislature.124 
 But this doesn't seem quite right.  Thayer’s approach did embody a respect 
for individual rights of the People; his theory of judicial restraint was borne out of 
the Republican tradition of deference as opposed to the Federalist tradition.  That is, 
the Court, as an agent for the People, is not to invalidate legislation unless the prin-
cipal’s command (the People, speaking through the Constitution) was clear.  In the 
Republican vision of the judiciary, the Court is itself, to use Barnett’s language, a 
“servant” of the People.  The “means by which the rights retained by the sovereign 
people are protected from their servants”125 is through Thayer’s clear error standard.  
As a result, Thayer’s principle of construction mollifies Barnet’s principle concern 
 
117 Id. at 152. 
118 Id. at 144. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 148 (“The judicial function is merely that of fixing the outside border of reasonable legislative ac-
tion.”). 
121 See supra Part II.B. 
122 RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 126 (2016). 
123 Id.  
124 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 54-62 (discussing their theory of judicial engagement, which puts 
the burden of persuasion (and ultimately, proof) on the government to proffer reasons for a law that infringes 
on individual liberty). 
125 See Mason, supra note 71. 
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about the rights of the People being invaded by their “servants.”  The difference that 
splits the two, it seems, is a question over which “servants” pose more of a threat to 
individual rights: the judges or the legislators.126  
B. Thayerianism and Fiduciary Duties 
 Thus, while Thayer, Barnett and Bernick all conceptualize of the govern-
ment as being an agent of the People, their fear of departmental overreach is located 
in different branches of government.  
 However, Barnett and Bernick also differ from Thayer specifically on the 
question of how clear the principal’s (We the People’s) instructions must be in order 
for the judiciary to deem an act unconstitutional.  Thayer, perhaps anchored in the 
Republican tradition, imposed a high barrier on the clarity of instruction: there must 
be “clear error” in order for a statute to be deemed unconstitutional.127   
 Barnett and Bernick, in building out their theory of the judge-as-agent,128 
“focus on one fiduciary duty that is particularly relevant to constitutional adjudica-
tion: the duty to follow instructions.”129  However, they take the opposite approach 
of Thayer.  Instead of requiring that the “instructions” in the Constitution be clear in 
order to invalidate a piece of legislation, Barnett and Bernick advocate that judges 
resort to the “function” or “spirit” of a provision (or an entire Constitution) in order 
to fulfill their role as agents of the People.130  
 The difficulty, of course, is exactly how judges are to follow instructions 
when the semantic meaning of a provision is unclear.  Barnett and Bernick turn to 
principles of contract law to provide an answer.  Specifically, the concept of the “duty 
of good-faith performance enables judges to police opportunism by preventing par-
ties from using discretion accorded them under the express terms of an agreement to 
defeat the fundamental purpose of the agreement.”131  
 Effectively, Barnett and Bernick advise that judges use the spirit of the law 
as a mechanism by which to engage in good-faith construction—drawing on basic 
principles of contract law that a party cannot upset the fundamental purpose of an 
 
126 Barnett and Bernick, while recognizing that judges themselves are also agents of the people, are much more 
concerned with legislative excess. Compare Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 14 (“References to govern-
ment officials as servants, agents, guardians, and trustees abound in Founding-era literature and in public de-
bates”) with Mason, supra note 71 at 15 (“That is, judges were understood to have a fiduciary duty to ensure 
that the people’s agents in the other branches adhered to their fiduciary duties”).  Thayer’s concern lies with an 
overweening judiciary. See Thayer, supra note 102 at 144 (explaining how the Congress is vested with Article 
I power, and as judicial review touches on questions of political administration, its power of review must be 
circumscribed by an understanding of the limits of judicial duty).   
127 Thayer, supra note 102, at 144. 
128 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 16 (“Judges are no exception to a general principle that is central 
to understanding the Constitution’s structure and content—the principle of fiduciary government.”). 
129 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 3. 
130 See, e.g., Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 34 (“For any given provision of the Constitution, there are 
reasons that the particular words were chosen, functions that those words were designed to perform.”); Barnett 
& Bernick, supra note 34, at 37 (“When the evidence concerning the function of a particular provision is not 
sufficiently clear for judges to identify and apply it, judges should have recourse to the spirit of the Constitution 
as a whole.”).  
131 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 23.  
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agreement by abusing gaps in the agreement. Barnett and Bernick lay out grounds 
rules for identifying the “spirit” of a provision:  
 
Has the judge taken account of the text, structure, and history of the 
provision? Has he explained why text, structure, and history point to-
wards a particular function? Has he defined that function with precision, 
at the proper level of generality? If a provision serves as a number of 
functions and he has concluded that one is particularly relevant to the 
kind of case that is now before the court, has he explained why? If more 
than one is relevant, has he sought to identify which function is of pri-
mary importance? How does the function he claims for the text compare 
with others?132  
 
 However, agency law, specifically with regard to the problem of vague or 
overly broad instructions, seems ill-suited for the task of constitutional interpretation.  
 As an initial matter, it is unclear that the fiduciary analogy of principal and 
agent fits neatly into the debate over how to engage in construction.  As detailed in 
the debates over the Council of Revision, it is doubtful whether the framers of the 
Constitution really intended to confer broad swaths of discretion on the judiciary, as 
opposed to in an agency context, where a principal can more effectively monitor an 
agent to verify that said agent is acting within acceptable parameters of discretion.  
The lack of an ability for “We the People” to effectively monitor the judiciary—save, 
perhaps, for a constitutional amendment or a bill from Congress—undercuts one of 
the main advantages of affording discretion to an agent, which is that the agent can 
confirm with the principal whether or not she should undertake the activity.133  This 
is simply not possible in the Article III context.  
 Second, Barnet and Bernick are correct that agency law permits an agent fill 
in gaps by reasonably seeking to fulfill the principal’s desires or wishes, as the agent 
knows them.134  As basic agency law states, “[the agent] is not free to disregard what 
[the agent] knows about [the principal’s] preferences, even if [the agent] believes 
them to be mistaken.”135  
 However, and importantly, “suppose [the agent] had no way of knowing 
about [the principal’s personal tastes].  How widely [others] share [the principal’s 
tastes] is relevant to whether [the agent] acted reasonably.”136  This notion of agency 
law—that the discretion exercised by an agent must be reasonably undertaken—im-
pugns the test that Barnett and Bernick submit.  Would it really ever be reasonably 
ascertainable that the spirit of a certain law is X versus Y?  Perhaps, yes, in particular 
circumstances.  
 But in the vast majority of others, it seems that a court would be unlikely to 
reasonably determine the spirit of a provision, especially given that “spirit” is often 
 
132 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 40. 
133 Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions at 7 (forth-
coming in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds. Oxford 
Univ. Press 2014)) (“Agents often resolve such questions by seeking clarification from the principal.”) 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5839&context=faculty_scholarship.  
134 See id. at 13-14. 
135 Id. at 13 
136 Id. at 14. 
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framed and discussed at such an elevated level of abstractness that any evidence of 
any “spirit” becomes compelling. Barnett and Bernick address this problem by ac-
knowledging that “[j]udges do, however, need to take care to properly identify the 
level of abstraction at which the function of a provision should be characterized . . . 
[t]here is no way to identify the appropriate level of abstraction without examining 
the evidence.”137  Unfortunately, this approach is circular: judges cannot know which 
level of abstraction to characterize the “spirit” of the law without examining the evi-
dence, but how can judges properly analyze and compile the evidence without having 
at least some sense of the level of abstraction at which they should look for the rele-
vant evidence?  
 In short, Barnett and Bernick share some base similarities with Thayer, if 
one agrees that they all conceive of the judiciary, in some sense, as an agent of the 
People.  Thayer was concerned, however, with judges using vague and unclear “in-
structions” as a method of thwarting the will of the People as expressed through leg-
islative enactments.  Barnett and Bernick have something of the opposite worry: 
judges not invalidating legislative enactments often enough, too often hiding behind 
the veil of semantic vagueness.  In support of their admonition that judges go beyond 
the text, and into the spirit of the clause, Barnett and Bernick rely on agency and 
fiduciary principles of good faith performance.  It is not entirely clear, however, that 
the theory of good faith performance in agency law can be mapped onto the judicial 
duty, if primarily due to (1) the inability for judges to confer with the principal (the 
People) and (2) the immense difficulty of properly formulating the level of abstrac-
tion upon which a judge could, in good faith, adduce evidence for or against a certain 
spirit of a provision. 
 
PART IV: THE CLASSICAL AVOIDANCE CANON AS A TIEBREAKER 
 The classical avoidance canon should not, however, simply be applied re-
flexively when one is in the so-called “construction zone.”  As Bernick notes, “re-
flexive deference to legislative judgments”138 marginalizes the role of the judiciary, 
and minimizes the duty that judges have to actually interpret the Constitution.  To do 
otherwise would be judicial abdication.139  
 Recognizing this problem, this Article proposes instead that the classical 
avoidance canon be used during the process of construction as a tiebreaker, or some-
thing approximating a tiebreaker.140  If the function of a particular provision is either 
unclear, or stands in equipoise with a competing function, the classical avoidance 
canon should counsel construction in favor of the legislative body.  This use of the 
 
137 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 34, at 34. 
138 See Evan Bernick, The Progressive Root of Judicial Restraint, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-bernick/the-progressive-roots-of-judicial-restraint_b_6925454.html.  
139 See Evan Bernick, Three Generations of Judicial Abdication Are Enough: A Reply to Carson Holloway 
(Part II), THE HUFFINGTON POST Post (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-ber-
nick/three-generations-of-judi_b_7040898.html. 
140 The rule of lenity, for example, is sometimes employed as a tiebreaker. See Muscarello v. United States, 
524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (using the rule of lenity as a tiebreaker).  
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canon was most “prominently defended” by Justice Scalia,141 but has been adopted 
by other Justices over time.142  
 U.S. v. X-Citement Video Inc.143 provides a good example of the tiebreaking 
theory of constitutional avoidance.  In X-Citement, the respondents were convicted 
under the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which 
prohibits “knowingly” transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing 
a visual depiction, if such depiction “involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.”144  The Court held that the scienter requirement—“knowingly”—
applied to both the act of transportation as well as to the age of the minor, in part due 
to the fact that had the Court not read “knowingly” to apply to both clauses, the statute 
would be constitutionally imperiled.145  In deploying the avoidance canon, the Court 
wrote that “[i]t is therefore incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate those 
doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”146  
 Justice Scalia took great issue with what he charged to be the Court’s tap-
dance around the statute’s plain unconstitutionality.  Only “every reasonable con-
struction,” he stated, “must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitu-
tionality.”147  Anything less would constitute judicial re-writing of the statute.148  Jus-
tice Scalia would have found that the statute unconstitutionally criminalized 
protected First Amendment activity due to its strict liability scheme.149 
 Similarly, in INS v. St. Cyr,150 Justice Scalia, dissenting, set forth his view 
on the necessary conditions for invoking the constitutional avoidance canon: “[t]he 
 
141 Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1280 
(2016) (“In one understanding of the canon, prominently defended by Justice Scalia, it is merely an interpretive 
tiebreaker—if there are two equally plausible readings of the statute, the avoidance canon selects the winner.”).  
142 See id. at 1287 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Nw. Austin. Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 212 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U.S. 490, 511, 516–18 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 345 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in the result); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 785–86 (1961) (Black, 
J., dissenting); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 144–45 (1961) (Black, J., 
dissenting); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting); Kent v. Dulles, 
357 U.S. 116, 131–32, 143 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 596–98 (1957) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (“What tips 
the scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State's law.”). 
143 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
144 Id. at 64. 
145 Id. at 78 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); and Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 115 (1990)) (“[A] statute 
completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would raise serious constitutional 
doubts.”). 
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 86 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).  
148 Id. (“Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, 
it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute or judicially rewriting it.”) 
(quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986)). 
149 Id. (“I would find the statute, as so interpreted, to be unconstitutional since, by imposing criminal liability 
upon those not knowingly dealing in pornography, it establishes a severe deterrent, not narrowly tailored to its 
purposes, upon fully protected First Amendment activities”). 
150 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
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condition precedent for application of the doctrine is that the statute can reasonably 
be construed to avoid the constitutional difficulty.”151  The key to Justice Scalia’s 
understanding of the avoidance canon was premised on the fact that “the doctrine of 
constitutional doubt is meant to effectuate, not to subvert, congressional intent, by 
giving ambiguous provisions a meaning that will avoid constitutional peril.”152  
 Now, to be sure, we don’t know what threshold level of ambiguity Justice 
Scalia is referring to.  However, one can surmise that Justice Scalia envisioned the 
canon applying when competing interpretations were in some degree of equipoise.  
Otherwise, such a provision would not be particularly ambiguous.  As Justice Scalia 
states, the avoidance canon “is a device for interpreting what the statute says.”153  
Thus, it seems clear that Justice Scalia envisioned the avoidance canon as a tool to 
be deployed when statutory meaning was unclear even after resorting to public-mean-
ing bearing sources.  Put differently, the semantic meaning of the statutory text would 
be irreducibly ambiguous.154  “The key point [for Scalia] is that [the avoidance canon] 
can only be used to resolve true ambiguities.”155 
 Such a condition precedent not only hints at Justice Scalia’s “vociferous de-
fen[se] of tiebreaking avoidance,”156 but is also an acknowledgement, perhaps im-
plicitly, that constitutional construction exists as a method to be administered when 
semantic interpretation fails to provide a clear answer.  As it happens, Justice Scalia 
was an ardent critic of the interpretation-construction distinction.157  However, his 
use of the avoidance canon belies such criticism.  As X-Citement and St. Cyr point 
to, Justice Scalia promoted the use of the avoidance canon when a provision was still 
semantically ambiguous or vague even after applying the usual methods of original-
ism and textualism.  This seems to be the area of construction.  Nonetheless, Justice 
Scalia was disciplined in cabining the use of the avoidance canon to situations where 
two competing semantic meanings were in some sense equally strong, rendering the 
provision irreducibly ambiguous.  In circumstances such as these, he approved of the 
application of the classical avoidance canon, which “makes the avoidance canon 
more like the rule of lenity—it breaks interpretive ties by choosing the interpretation 
that advances certain system values.”158  The use of the classical avoidance canon in 
this manner has been advanced by academics as well.159 
 
151 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 Irreducible ambiguity is a condition precedent for construction. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, and accom-
panying discussion. 
155 Fish, supra note 141 at 1286. 
156 See Fish, supra note 141 at 1286. 
157 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 13-14 (“[N]ontextualists have latched onto the duality of construction. 
From the germ of an idea in the theoretical works of…Francis Lieber, scholars have elaborated a supposed 
distinction between interpretation and construction . . . . Thus is born, out of false linguistic association, a whole 
new field of legal inquiry.”). 
158 See Fish, supra note 141, at 1286. 
159 See Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 331, 336 (2015) (“[E]ven if a general canon about avoiding constitutional questions is not a reliable 
guide to the intended meaning of statutory language, courts could still use such a canon as a tiebreaker when 
their ordinary tools for identifying a statute's intended meaning leave them in equipoise between two read-
ings.”); Michael Ramsey, A Lot More on Constitutional Avoidance, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (June 15, 2015) 
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CONCLUSION 
Courts must often engage in the process of construction.160  When semantic or 
linguistic meaning is impossible to accurately discern due to either due to vagueness 
or irreducible ambiguity, “construction becomes obvious . . . [because] [semantic] 
interpretation cannot resolve the case.”161 
In building towards a theory of “good faith constitutional construction,” Randy 
Barnett and Evan Bernick would be wise to incorporate the classical avoidance canon 
as a principle of good faith construction.  If originalists value their semantic interpre-
tive methodology for its ability to rein in the discretion of judges,162 they should value 
a constructive methodology that, if premised on application of the classical avoidance 




chael-ramsey.html (“I suppose if the statute is perfectly ambiguous -- that is, there are two exactly equal mean-
ings) perhaps the avoidance canon could be a tie breaker...”); Edward C. Dawson, Adjusting the Presumption 
of Constitutionality Based on Margin of Statutory Passage, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 97, 109 (2013) (“[A]t times, 
some Justices on the modern Court seem to view the presumption as a mere tiebreaker that will only prompt a 
vote to uphold the statute if other considerations are in equipoise.”).  
160 See Kay, supra note 12 at 2 (“It is hard to deny the conceptual distinctness of these two kinds of activities.”).  
161 Solum, supra note 2, at 95. 
162 Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A Useful Fiction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 71 (2010) (“[O]riginalism...concentrated on (at least) two commitments: (1) pushing against the 
doctrinal developments of the Warren Court and (2) constraining judicial activity by limiting judicial discre-
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